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Latin America ' 
Jorge Graciarena * 
This study examines the forms of income 
concentration in capitalist economic 
growth in Latin America. First it deals 
with the recent income distribution 
trends of a number of countries in the 
region, highlighting the forms of concen-
tration in different periods. It goes on to 
study the types of concentration which 
can be inferred from the trends observed 
and the structural forms and specific 
political processes which accompany 
them, taking into account some of the 
economic explanations which have been 
in fashion in recent years. Finally, it 
attempts to show that the patterns of 
income distribution, besides having 
undeniable economic foundations,- at the 
same time possess deep roots linking their 
composition and transformations with 
the prevailing social structure, political 
régimes and styles of development. 
The first draft of this study was finished 
during the second half of 1974 and later revised 
in form rather than in substance. 
•Deputy Director, Social Development 
Division, CEPAL. 
1. 
Economic theory and 
income concentration 
in development 
Concern for income distribution trends 
and their relationship with economic 
growth and social development has 
become so great in recent years that the 
topic has acquired top priority in 
international forums and in the academic 
centres of Latin America. After having 
occupied for many years a central 
position in political debate, the problem 
of income concentration has once again 
become topical in intellectual circles, 
due in part to the interest aroused by the 
question of development styles and, at 
another level, to the practical need to 
make economic growth compatible with 
social welfare at a point in time when 
the trend towards concentration is still 
very much at work. 
Thus the controversy on this 
question, to which we will return later, 
mainly concerns the extreme inequality 
of income distribution -how little the 
poorest strata receive and how much 
those at the top of the scale receive-
and the effect of this situation and 
possible changes in it upon short-term 
economic growth. The discussion invol-
ves a mixture of humanitarian argu-
ments, developmental concerns and 
private interests related to the political 
stability and continuity of the current 
economic and social systems. The 
question is of long standing, perhaps as 
old as the world itself, with the 
difference that now, in some circles, 
there is an attempt to discuss this highly 
complex subject as if it were a technical 
problem without social and political 
ramifications. 
Over the last few decades many 
authors have reviewed the available 
statistical data with a view to discovering 
the relationship between economic 
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growth and income distribution. In 1954 
Simon Kuznets, after asking whether 
inequality in the distribution of income 
increases or decreases in the course of a 
country's economic growth, found 
empirical grounds for the hypothesis 
that in the first stages of industrializa-
tion of the under-developed countries 
income inequalities will tend to increase 
until the balancing forces are sufficiently 
strong to stabilize and subsequently 
reduce them. Later in the same work, 
after examining a considerable amount 
of historical data on the original 
industrialized countries, he finds that the 
hypothesis is sufficiently proven and 
asserts that in the under-developed 
countries, too, economic growth has led 
to greater inequality of income distribu-
tion.2 
Kuznets* study emphasized the high 
concentration of wealth which existed as 
a result of the lack of dynamic forces 
working towards greater equity in 
income distribution or of government 
policies with the same end. From a 
similar standpoint, W. Arthur Lewis 
re-examined the theoretical foundations 
of income concentration, returning to 
the fountainhead of classical economic 
theory, above all Adam Smith and 
Ricardo, and asserting with them that if 
there were unlimited supplies of labour, 
wages would inevitably tend to fall to a 
subsistence level. In a situation of 
under-development with abundant 
supplies of labour, capital formation and 
technical progress result not in raising 
2S. Kuznets, "Economic Growth and 
Income. Inequality" in The American Economic 
Review (Vol. XLV, N9 1, March 1955, pages 
1-28). Kuznets later returned to this problem 
in: Six Lectures on Economic Growth, Illinois, 
The Free Press, 1959; and also in: Modern 
Economic Growth; Rate, Structure and Spread, 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969. 
wages, but in raising the share of profits 
in the national income.3 
This absence of redistributive forces 
in the growth process stems from 
inadequate capital formation because 
"savings are low", the reason being "not 
that people are poor but that capitalist 
profits are low". Later, "as the capitalist 
sector expands [in comparison with the 
traditional sector], profits grow relati-
vely and an increasing proportion of 
national income is re-invested".4 Never-
theless, so long as the supply of labour is 
unlimited, wages will remain low and 
close to the subsistence level. Thus this 
analytical model assumes indefinite 
population growth; a wholly unstructu-
red labour force, which is therefore at 
the mercy of the "laws of the market"; 
unrestricted job mobility of the popula-
tion; and a lack of government policies 
to correct this bias in the ailocation of 
income. 
In all these cases it is assumed (and 
Kuznets strove to prove) that this period 
of penury is no more than a transitory 
phase which will invariably be overcome 
as soon as production grows and the 
economy is sufficiently modernized for 
the dynamic forces characteristic of the 
capitalist system to emerge; these will 
counteract the trends towards income 
concentration and give rise to a more 
equitable structure in the following 
phase. 
More recently, F. Paukert reviewed 
the existing statistical data for a large 
number of countries and examined the 
hypothesis of Kuznets, who —as mentio-
3W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic develop-
ment with unlimited supplies of labour", in The 
Manchester School of Economic and Social 
Studies, Vol. XXII, N9 1, January 1954, 
p. 190. 
"Ibid., p. 190. 
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ned above— had tried to verify it 
empirically only for various historical 
phases of the industrialized capitalist 
countries. Unfortunately Paukert's work 
is not historical but rather synchronic 
since it compares the contemporary 
situation of countries with very different 
structures and income concentrations. 
At all events, however, his findings are 
important. His main conclusion confirms 
Kuznets* hypothesis, since he found a 
widespread situation of higher income 
concentration in the countries with 
lower levels of development (measured 
by the per capita product) or, in other 
words, an inverse relationship between 
the two, which changes when the levels 
of development are raised, with the 
result that the coefficients of inequality 
are reduced. This change is not gradual 
but occurs when a certain threshold in 
the degree of development is passed. 
This turning-point where distribution 
begins to improve occurs, according to 
Paukert, in countries with a development 
level of around 500 dollars per capita: 
i.e., a level which is lower than the 
present average per capita income in 
Latin America.5 
These studies, both theoretical and 
empirical, are of great interest for a 
better understanding of the increasingly 
abundant information on the problem of 
income concentration: a problem of 
great importance not only in connexion 
with other related economic problems, 
such as the size of the domestic market 
and the demand profile, but also with 
regard to the job deficit and the social 
tensions and political conflicts generated 
5 See F. Paukert, "Income distribution at 
different levels of development: a survey of the 
evidence" in international Labour Review, 
vol. 108, Nos. 2-3, August-September 1973, 
tableó, pp. 114-115, table 7 (p. 118) and 
diagram 1 (p. 119). 
by inequitable patterns of distribution of 
wealth and income. 
In the present study6 we shall briefly 
survey the available data, above all to 
test the validity of the hypothesis of 
increasing concentration and see if this 
6 The theoretical scheme of this study is 
based on some distinctions about levels of 
analysis and of reality which cannot be 
discussed here because of their nature and 
complexity. Starting from an earlier study of 
ours ("Estructura de poder y distribución del 
ingreso en América Latina", Revista Latino-
americana de ciencia política, Vol. II, N° 2, 
August 1971), we distinguish three analyticaí 
and objective levels according to their degree of 
generality and autonomy. The first is the 
economic and social system, which in this study 
corresponds to capitalism; in general when we 
talk here of "capitalist concentration" it is 
implied that capitalism as a mode of production 
constitutes the basis of the income distribution. 
The second level is the economic and social 
structure, which is a national structure 
conditioned by the social system and its 
historical situation, including the international 
order. Finally, there are the styles of 
development, which are the concrete historical 
forms adopted by the structures and systems in 
the specific hegemonistic situation at any 
particular time. It is at this last level that 
political forces have their freest play, although 
by no means to the exclusion of possible 
short-term variations of economic origin. 
Countries which are part of the same social 
system and have similar degrees of development 
nevertheless have different types of income 
concentration. An explanation must therefore 
be sought for these variations which sometimes 
occur within a single country at different but 
neighbouring periods in its history. Our main, 
and very modest, proposition is that at this 
level, with the system and the structure 
remaining constant, the political régime and the 
hegemonistic style accompanying it are essen-
tial factors in the changes in the types of 
concentration. This study therefore stresses the 
possible causal forces stemming in the short 
term from the political régime and specific 
historical situations, bearing in mind the 
conditioning effect exerted on them by the 
prevailing social system and the structural basis 
of the distribution of income. 
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trend is reversed when Latin America 
reaches the income threshold in 
question, leading to a more equitable 
structure of participation. We shall also 
attempt to identify particular types of 
income concentration. Finally, we shall 
examine the relationship between 
specific forms of income concentration 
Current studies of income concentration 
in Latin American countries view partici-
pation in the social product as being 
determined by various kinds of factors. 
First, it is argued that the region's 
colonial past and the natural resources 
and particular historical circumstances of 
each country conditioned the initial 
formation of highly concentrated distri-
bution patterns, as well as a structure of 
land ownership and possession of liquid 
assets (in other words, wealth) which 
was from the start also very concentra-
ted. It is further held that technological 
and social modernization has been 
occurring in such a way as to change the 
traditional distribution patterns but at 
the same time maintain, although in 
different ways, a high level of income 
concentration. However, the claim is still 
made that these concentrative trends will 
be reversed in the future, when econo-
mic growth will produce its rapid, 
far-reaching corrective effects once the 
modern capitalist mode of production 
becomes widespread. The third argu-
ment, widely encountered inside and 
outside Latin America, is that of 
structural heterogeneity, which rejects 
and more general socio-political structu-
res. In other words, we shall attempt to 
show that political régimes and public 
policies are something more than a 
residual factor in explaining the struc-
ture and continuity of patterns of 
income distribution. 
the latter possibility and postulates that 
the highly inequitable distribution of 
income prevailing in the region will 
continue for a long time, despite the 
great economic growth which has occur-
red in recent decades, because of the 
great differences in sectoral productivity 
characteristic of the growth of under-
developed economies. This structural 
heterogeneity will contribute to the 
destruction of the bases supporting 
archaic forms of inequality, but at the 
same time it will create new ones, which 
will tend to last as long as the conditions 
moulding them remain. 
In one of the first comparative 
studies on income distribution in Latin 
America carried out by CEPAL it was 
pointed out that the growing inequality 
which could be observed, with high 
absolute levels and the concentration of 
total income at the top of the scale, was 
a feature common to all the countries of 
the region. In addition, this income 
concentration in the top decile was 
essentially a reflection of the concentra-
tion of ownership, which should not be 
interpreted narrowly as the ownership of 
property as such, but also included 
2. 
The structural foundations of income 
concentration and its recent trends 
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sources of credit, market positions and 
other factors of that kind.7 
Income concentration, then, was 
interpreted in that study as an inherent 
feature of the process of capitalist 
growth as'it was occurring in the region. 
It was therefore supposed that the 
process would naturally tend to have the 
effect of concentrating income in the 
groups at the distribution peak, unques-
tionably a small segment of the popula-
tion -generally 5 or perhaps 10 per 
cent- composed primarily of capital-
owning entrepreneurs, a smaller propor-
tion of top executive and salaried 
supervisory-level employees of domestic 
and foreign private companies and public 
sector bodies, and a still smaller number 
of rentiers, passive stockholders who do 
not personally take part in the produc-
tive process. 
This trend towards concentration 
appears as a general feature of economic 
growth which is heightened in conditions 
of dependent under-development. When 
the same study goes on to analyse 
income distribution in Argentina, 
however, a reservation is made about the 
size of the share of the middle sectors in 
the country's income, and it is asserted 
that their advantageous position is to a 
large extent a political matter,8 In other 
words, it is expressly admitted that 
besides economic, structural and 
conjunctural factors, political events and 
processes may have a considerable 
influence on the specific form taken by 
an income distribution profile and on 
the position of the different social 
groups in it. On many occasions CEPAL 
documents have pointed out the effects 
of non-economic factors which have in 
7 CE PAL, Estudios sobre la distribución del 
ingreso en América Latina, mimeo, E/CN.12/ 
770, 29 March 1967, p. 6. 
*Ibid., p. 6. 
various ways affected the dynamics of 
income distribution. However, these 
references have usually been made in 
passing and are not systematically 
incorporated in the body of the 
explanation of the forces responsible for 
the concentration of income at the top 
of the scale.9 
This is not the moment to indulge in 
a theoretical discussion on income 
distribution. As indicated above, we are 
concerned rather with identifying the 
configurations of the concentration 
process in Latin America; in other 
words, with determining whether 
concentration really is more intense at 
the top or at other levels of the scale, in 
which groups it is most concentrated, 
and in what political conditions. We are 
also interested in discovering to What 
degree the expectations of greater equity 
as the economy grows and diversifies are 
fulfilled. Thus the fundamental question 
is whether the income increments 
generated by economic growth are more 
9 The argument about the problem of 
income concentration as an "organic" require-
ment for capital formation has grown sharper 
recently, particularly in the countries where the 
concentrative effects have been shown to be 
particularly strong. The opposing positions on 
the question are clearly defined: on the one 
hand, there are those who argue that income 
concentration is vital to obtain high rates of 
capital formation, efficiency and economic 
rationality; on the other, those who assert that 
economic growth can be made compatible with 
social welfare, that in any case the latter should 
always have priority, and that if some sacrifice 
is necessary it should affect economic growth 
rather than social welfare. It is not our concern 
here to study the grounds of the controversy, 
still less to judge the validity of the arguments. 
It is worth recalling this matter, however, 
because the positions outlined are somewhat 
like the foundations of the economic and social 
policies which contribute to the different forms 
of income concentration. We shall return to this 
problem later. 
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or less strongly concentrated than the 
volume of income generated in the 
preceding phase, where this concentra-
tion occurs and what its political causes 
are. 
Regrettably, the information availa-
ble is neither complete nor entirely 
reliable; there are sometimes quite 
important contradictions when data 
from different statistical sources are 
collated. It should also be noted that it is 
only in a few cases that information is 
available for a sufficiently long period to 
be able to make relatively sound 
inferences about trends. Thus the data at 
hand and the analyses based on them do 
not enable a precise and reliable 
evaluation to be made of the direction in 
which income distribution is moving nor 
of its particular features with regard to 
social groups, occupation strata and 
educational levels.10 
10 The available information has increased 
sharply in recent years, but the disaggregation, 
precision and reliabiUty of the results are still 
inadequate. Most global estimates are based on 
assumptions which are apparently plausible but 
far from having been proven empirically. In 
addition, their coverage is only partial because 
they do not include items which, while not 
monetary income, are important for the levels 
of welfare and consumption of the different 
strata of the population (credit, consumption 
of own produce, personal services, etc.). 
Finally, the existing estimates only link in a 
very limited way the trend of income 
distribution with the accumulation and rotation 
of wealth. A large part of capital profits are not 
converted into income, but are retained in 
companies to produce further capital incre-
ments which constitute potential sources of 
future income. Due to these and other 
shortcomings, the problems of income concen-
tration must be studied separately from the 
accumulation of productive assets and other 
forms of wealth. It is known that there is an 
almost osmotic relationship between the 
income pyramids and wealth but, unfortunate-
ly, there is little soundly-based knowledge 
available on this question. 
For the time being, what is known 
about income distribution in the more 
representative countries of the region is 
that, with conjunctural variations, the 
trends towards concentration have conti-
nued to rise in most countries, have 
come to a standstill in some, and have 
dropped in only a very few cases. 
Furthermore, two types of concen-
tration may be observed. The first, at the 
apex of the distribution pyramid, as 
suggested by classical economic theory, 
we shall call elitist concentration. The 
seeond, mainly in the segment just below 
the apex, i.e., the upper middle sectors, 
we shall refer to here as mesocratic 
concentration.11 
It would be equally important to have data 
that would permit the study of the relationship 
between income distribution trends and the 
occupational structure, properly broken down 
by occupational types, levels and sectors. 
Similarly, better and more complete informa-
tion is needed on education and its effects on 
distribution and on consumption by population 
strata and in relation to occupation and 
incomes. Finally, too little is known about the 
use of income in the consumption unit, i.e., the 
family, about who allocates and distributes it 
within the unit, and in accordance with what 
needs and criteria. These reservations on the 
quality and coverage of the statistical data on 
income distribution are not necessarily dispel-
led by the use in some studies of econometric 
devices with sophisticated mathematical formu-
lae, statistical coefficients and graphs. 
1 ' It is only too well known that the 
problem of identifying and defining the middle 
sectors, strata or classes is highly complex, both 
because of their intrinsic nature and structural 
position -which can only be conceptualized in 
a broader general theoretical framework— and 
due to their own internal heterogeneity, which 
grows ever greater with the modernization of 
society. Besides these complications, there are 
those of a methodological nature which arise 
when one attempts to situate these social 
aggregates in specific contexts, i.e., when one 
thinks about them as occupational, educational, 
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In both cases, as the terms we have 
chosen show, these conceptual types 
allude not only to the direction in which 
income is mainly concentrated, but also 
to the nature of the prevailing structure 
of domination and the stratified groups 
predominant in it and in the income 
distribution. Thus the analytical catego-
ries used combine the dimensions of 
income and power, which converge at the 
apex both of the distribution and of the 
existing mode of domination. Conse-
quently, the explicit proposition which 
Our purpose in presenting the following 
data on income distribution is not to 
describe and explain the concentrative 
trends, at the national level, of the 
countries mentioned in the text12 but 
rather to illustrate possible forms of 
distribution which appear to be emerging 
in the present Latin American economic 
consumption or income layers. The practical 
distinctions differ considerably. For our pur-
pose, unless otherwise indicated the following 
income strata will be distinguished: high, those 
in the top 5 per cent of the distribution; upper 
middle, those immediately below, but not 
lower than the top 20 per cent (top 5 to 20 per 
cent); lower middle or intermediate, a vaguer 
category which generally refers to the levels 
beneath the preceding ones but above the 
bottom 40 per cent of the distribution; and 
popular, the remaining bottom 40 per cent, 
within which the poor represent the bottom 20 
per cent of the distribution. To repeat, these 
groupings are conventional and approximative, 
and sometimes there are slight nominal or 
aggregative changes. Finally, distribution is 
most dynamic in the top 20 per cent, which is 
also where most of the modern sector of the 
economy is concentrated. 
forms the point of departure for this 
study is that these two dimensions, 
income concentration and social power, 
are closely related. It is also assumed 
that the appropriation of income is one 
of the main targets of political action 
and struggle, particularly in the context 
of development styles defined by the 
need to achieve high rates of economic 
growth with patterns favouring concentra-
tion, so as to enable high private capital 
formation to take place in the economy. 
and political situation. Thus we shall 
study not national situations but cases 
embracing problems of a more general 
character, with a view to finding out 
whether it is possible to distinguish 
within them, as is assumed, varying 
trends in income distribution and 
concentration related to their more 
general social formations and socio-
political styles. 
In other words, the problem is to 
determine the forms adopted by the 
process of income concentration, the 
degree of concentration in each group or 
stratum, and the explanation of these 
features of income distribution in a 
broader framework which takes into 
account the economic growth and 
socio-political dynamics of the styles of 
12 Naturally, we are not attempting to 
replace or even summarize the sources mentio-
ned below, nor are we questioning their 
validity. In some cases, an indication is merely 
given of their limitations in coverage and 
comparability. 
3. 
The types of income concentration 
and some illustrative cases 
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capitalist development in the region. The 
present study is aimed in this direction 
but has a more modest objective, which 
is little more than to indicate tentatively 
some of the more striking political and 
structural features of the process of 
income concentration. 
The concentrative trends observed in 
most countries of the region can be 
classified in two clearly differentiated 
types which are, it may be recalled, 
elitist and mesocratic concentration. The 
two types are distinguished by differen-
ces in the main indicators of income 
distribution, but these in turn represent 
different development styles and thus 
varying coalitions of social forces promo-
ting them through action in various 
political circles. All this is what we shall 
attempt to identify below. For the time 
being, we shall begin with the examina-
tion of the available empirical infor-
mation. 
The elitist type of concentration 
This could be illustrated by the situa-
tions in a number of countries of the 
region. It is characterized by an increa-
sing concentration of income among 
those at the apex of the distribution 
pyramid (top 5 per cent), at the expense 
of the middle and bottom groups. The 
strongest concentrative trend is in the 
urban sector, where almost all the 
industrial and service enterprises are to 
be found. Thus it is associated with the 
high growth rates of these activities, 
particularly the so-called dynamic ones, 
which are what give the expansion of the 
economic system its stimulus and main 
direction. In this stage at least, the effect 
of economic modernization tends to be 
concentrative, since the increment, 
mostly generated by the dynamic sectors 
of industry, tends to be accumulated as 
much as or more than income was 
concentrated in the preceding stage. This 
may be seen from the rising coefficients 
of inequality and rates of participation 
of the groups at the top of the 
distribution, and also in the breakdown 
of income by productive sector. 
The case of Brazil This type of 
concentration may be illustrated by 
taking the case of Brazil, a country for 
which there are a number of good 
studies on income distribution trends 
based on the aggregate data obtained 
from the general censuses of 1960 and 
1970. No other country in this category 
offers such possibilities or represents 
such a paradigm of a style of develop-
ment for other countries of the region. 
The various existing studies appear 
to be mutually coherent, since their 
more general estimates are highly conver-
gent. In the first place, as may be seen in 
table 1, all the sources indicate, with 
slight variations, that between 1960 and 
1970 the trend in income distribution 
was towards a clear and considerable 
concentration at the top, at the expense 
of the poorer half of the population. 
The differences in the estimates in 
table 1 stem from the analytical outlook 
and the methodology adopted to adjust 
the figures, since in every case the data 
are taken from the 1960 and 1970 
censuses. 
A broader comparison could be 
made by considering all the strata, 
suitably grouped as in table 2, and in 
addition calculating the rates of growth 
(or negative growth) of their income 
during the period. 
In connexion with Langoni*s estima-
te which appears in table 2, it should be 
pointed out that it has the most 
moderate findings of all on the concen-
trative trends in income observed in the 
decade. Other authors such as Hoffman 
and Duarte, who also use the general 
censuses for the estimates but with 
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Table 1 
BRAZIL: INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 196<M970a 
Estimates 
- Fishlow 
— Hoffman and Duarte 















aData taken from J. Serra, A Reconcentraçao da Renda: Crítica a Algunas Interpretares, in 
Estudos CEBRAP-5, Juíy-September 1973, pp. 131 to 155. For the last estimate, see also 
C.G. Langoni, Distribuçâo da Renda e Desenvolvimento Económico do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 
Expressào e Cultura, 1973, p. 64, table N° 3.5) whose data coincide entirely. The same author 
makes a similar comparison for 1960 in table 3.3 (p. 62) and for 1970 in table 3.4 (p. 63). 
Table 2 































- 2 . 8 
- 5 . 0 
- 0 . 2 
+ 8.1 












Source: C.G. Langoni, op.cit., table 3.5 (p. 64). The figures on the relative differences between the 
two years were prepared by us on the basis of his data. 
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somewhat different adjustments, give 
figures which accentuate the differences 
between the two extremes of the scale. 
They indicate, for example, that while 
the income share of the poorest 50 per 
cent of the population dropped from 18 
to 14 per cent between 1960 and 1970, 
a 4-point loss, the richest 5 per cent 
increased their share from 27 to 36 per 
cent, a 9-point (or one-third) gain, and 
the share of the top 1 per cent grew still 
more, rising from 12 to 18 per cent (a 
gain of 50 per cent over their share in 
I960) . 1 3 
13"The income distribution apex (in 1970) 
composed of the 5 per cent of remunerated 
persons who receive 36 per cent of total 
income, i.e., 26.4 times the average income of 
the half of the population situated at the other 
end of the distribution scale. This 5 per cent is 
the permanent basis of the market for 
consumer durable goods, a limited base which 
has moulded many of the characteristics of the 
industrialization process in Brazil." The average 
level of growth of the lower half of the 
population "remained unchanged in this period, 
despite a 79 per cent rise in the GDP. If it is 
considered that the percentage of income 
recipients dropped from 35.4 to 31.4 per cent 
of the population between the two censuses 
analysed, we deduce that the per capita income 
of this part of the population must have 
dropped in some way. In the following deciles 
average incomes had increments of little 
significance. The significant increases in income 
were reserved above all for the 5 per cent of the 
population with the highest incomes" . . . "Our 
conclusion is that half the population was not 
reached by the benefits of economic growth (at 
least in monetary terms) and that the following 
30 per cent had only marginal access to those 
benefits". See R. Hoffman and J.C. Duarte, "A 
Distribuçâo da Renda no Brasil", in Revista de 
Administraçao de Empresas, Vol.12, N° 2, 
April-June 1972, pp. 44-66 (quotation from 
pp. 59 and 60). It is also interesting to note the 
following observations by Celso Furtado: "The 
'upper middle class' to which we refer is 
composed in Brazil of the 5 per cent of the 
population with the highest standard of living; 
the average family income of this group was 
close to 1 000 dollars in 1970. The provisional 
Even more interesting is an analysis 
of the relative and absolute differences 
in the income pyramid in the decade 
1960-1970. First, the strata which lost 
ground most noticeably are quite clearly 
those around the centre of the scale. 
While the bo t tom decile lost relatively 
little (-5 per cent), the deciles immedia-
tely above had smaller shares up to the 
ninth decile; in contrast, the share of the 
tenth (top) decile rose markedly. From a 
more detailed study of the strata which 
lost in relative terms it appears that 
those whose position suffered most were 
the strata in the group ranging from the 
fifth to the seventh decile, which show a 
considerable average relative loss (-22 per 
cent) with a slow decline towards the 
two extremes. The share of the eighth 
decile also declined, as did that of the 
ninth to a small degree.14 
data of the 1970 census lead us to believe that 
the purchasing power of this group grew almost 
three times as fast as that of the average of the 
population" (Celso Furtado, Análise do Modelo 
Brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro, Civilizaçâo Brasileira, 
1972, p. 42, footnote 32.) 
1 4 One analyst describes these movements 
as "downward levelling": "An analysis of the 
changes in the income distribution structure in 
Brazil between 1960 and 1970 clearly shows 
what has been called 'downward levelling' : 
during that decade average income rose 36.9 
per cent, the income of the richest 5 per cent 
grew by 75.4 per cent, that of the poorest 40 
per cent rose by 18.3 per cent and that of the 
intermediate 20 per cent scarcely grew by 7.7 
per cent. As it happens, it is this middle 20 per 
cent whose average income is closest to the 
minimum wage. This means that in a period of 
high development in Brazil, the strata with 
incomes below the minimum wage, many of 
them belonging to the sub-proletariat, improved 
their position somewhat more than the 
worst-paid strata of the urban proletariat. Thus 
the inequality between the poorest strata of the 
country and the city was reduced by a genuine 
downward levelling movement; while at the 
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Secondly, a detailed study of the top 
decile confirms the assumption that 
concentration is greatest at the apex of 
the pyramid. The position of the tenth 
decile improved by 20 per cent over the 
rest of the population, whose relative 
share decreased, but the top quintile's 
share grew still faster, accounting for 
most of the growth of the decile, 
because the penultimate quintile's posi-
tion only improved slightly. The share of 
the 1 per cent of the population with the 
highest incomes, for its part, grew more 
than the average for the tenth decile, but 
less than the top quintile. Thus the data 
conclusively indicate that the majority 
of the growth of income in this period 
was concentrated in the upper layer of 
the top quintile of the distribution scale, 
i.e., some 4.5 to 5 million persons.15 
Another feature of the estimates in 
the above tables should be pointed out. 
Since they are based on the census data, 
they only took into account the 
remunerated economically active popula-
tion (i.e., income recipients), thus 
excluding the unemployed and those 
who had recently joined the labour force 
and were still without work. Since the 
size of this group changed considerably 
between 1960 and 1970, falling from 
14.7 to 11.7 per cent, the rise in 
same time the gap between them and the 
privileged minority grew wider". Paul Israel 
Singer, "Implicaçôes económicas e sociais da 
dinámica populacional Brasileira", in Estudos 
sobre a Populaçâo Brasileira, Sâo Paulo, 
CEBRAP, Caderno N° 20, p. 15. 
15 It should be borne in mind, at the risk of 
appearing repetitious, that the above differen-
ces refer to changes in the relative positions of 
the strata within the income pyramid, i.e., to 
variations in the size of their shares in the 
distribution, which represent gains or losses 
over other strata, and not to the increases in the 
average incomes of the various income groups. 
employment had a positive effect, 
particularly in the poorer strata, 
although without being able to avert the 
considerable contraction of wages. 
Fishlow, who studied income distri-
bution in a somewhat different fashion, 
also concluded that concentration at the 
apex was very high.16 
Some preliminary conclusions can be 
drawn from these data. In the first place, 
it seems clear that the income incre-
ments tended to be concentrated in the 
top 5 per cent, which absorbed more 
than one-third of total income at the end 
of the period. Secondly, the concentra-
tion was greatest in the branches of 
production and social areas where 
16 "Although regrettable, the conclusion 
that inequality increased in the course of the 
decade seems to be correct. The 3.2 per cent at 
the top of the labour force in 1970 obtained 33 
per cent of total income whereas in 1960 they 
received only 27 per cent... It may validly be 
objected that the 1970 data are not fair 
evidence of the implications of rapid growth in 
the capitalist mould" because "since 1964 (a 
little over half the decade), there has been 
continuous military government, and only the 
latter part of the period is characterized by 
considerable material progress. It is reasonable 
to assume that responsibiUty for the rise in 
inequality must be attributed to stabilization 
rather than growth. Between 1964 and 1967, as 
a result of strictly holding down nominal 
salaries and achieving 'corrective inflation' 
—price adjustments fixed administratively by 
the Government— real minimum wages fell by 
20 per cent, and subsequently they barely kept 
level". A. Fishlow, "Distribución del ingreso 
por tramos en Brasil", in A. Foxley (ed.) 
Distribución del ingreso en America Latina, 
Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1973, pp. 106 and 107. Unfortunately this 
author did not form regular strata but rather 
income layers, producing uneven groups of ; 
economically active population which are 
scarcely comparable with strata grouped by 
deciles, quintiles, etc. This complicates any 
attempt at strict comparison with the other 
authors considered. 
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technological modernization and econo-
mic dynamism were strongest.17 
Thirdly, the fact that the poorest 
categories in the distribution did not 
decline as much as the groups in the 
middle of the scale was due to various 
factors, particularly the policies designed 
to increase employment, social security 
and social services, with a view to 
eliminating "absolute poverty".1 8 More-
over, their closeness to the subsistence 
levels has made it almost impossible to 
push the incomes of these groups down, 
and this partly explains their resistance 
to further deterioration. 
17 This conclusion is confirmed by the data 
relating to distribution by sector and income 
area, which show how income was concentrated 
more in the urban sector than in primary 
production. These disaggregated data show still 
more bluntly that in the urban sector the base 
of the pyramid (bottom 10 per cent) grew both 
relatively and absolutely while all the central 
part dropped very sharply, up to the eighth 
decile; in the ninth decile there was a slight 
reversal of the trend. There was very pronoun-
ced growth in the tenth decile, which in 1970 
received 45 per cent of income. Once again the 
peak is in the top 5 per cent, whose share rose 
from 27 per cent in 1960 to 34 per cent in 
1970. In the primary sector, this layer receives 
a smaller share and grows even less: in 1960 its 
share was 23 per cent against 27 per cent in 
1970. The variation in this sector is only 16 per 
cent, as apposed to an improvement of 26 per 
cent in the urban sector. Cf. C.G. Langoni, 
op. cit., tables 3.7 and 3.8, pp. 68 and 70. 
18 "There also seems to be little doubt that 
one of the immediate consequences of the 
higher rate of growth is the drop in the level of 
poverty.. . because of the high level of 
employment". These arguments are put 
forward by C.G. Langoni, op. cit, p. 214. The 
effect of the expansion and improvement of 
employment on income distribution has been 
stressed by an ex-minister, A. Delfim Netto, in 
his preface to Langoni's book. Fishlow has 
questioned the point that the greater inequality 
was due to the rapid growth of the economy. 
Contrary to what Langoni maintains, he argues 
Fourthly, it has also been argued 
that the great expansion of education in 
this period helped tc increase employ-
ment opportunities in an economy 
undergoing a process of rapid techno-
logical modernization. 
Finally, the trend appears to have 
been one of concentration of income in 
the form of profits from capital and 
property rather than wages and salaries. 
This was more accentuated in the 
modern sector, where the advantages of 
productivity have had little effect on 
average wage levels, which have fallen 
behind and failed to share fully in the 
benefits of technical progress. Thus 
average real wages have lost ground, 
despite the considerable progress 
brought about by the technological 
modernization of the Brazilian econo-
my.1 9 This observation is not affected 
by the fact that in the same period 
nominal wages underwent a very marked 
hierarchization and diversification. 
that inequality became greater in the recession 
period (1964-1967) and was therefore not the 
result of the upheaval caused by the rapid 
growth in the following period. Thus it was the 
slow growth during the period of the 
stabilization policies which was associated with 
the most regressive effects, since it particularly 
affected real wages and salaries. Cf. A. Fishlow, 
"Distribuçâo da Renda no Brasil: Urn Novo 
Exame", Dados, N9 11, 1973, pp. 23 and 28. 
This same work also contains the study by 
C.G. Langoni, "Distribuçâo da Renda no Brasil: 
Resumo da Evidencia", where he argues with 
Fishlow about the interpretation of the 
Brazilian economic process. 
19 Hoffman and Duarte, op. cit., give some 
figures which confirm this. For example, in Sao 
Paulo between 1961 and 1970 there was a 
steady drop in real wages amounting to 30 per 
cent (page 61). The table below shows how real 
wages in Brazilian industry, primarily manual 
workers' wages, fell behind in comparison with 
the rise in productivity, which would confirm 
that the relative share of capital profits 
improved. 
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Hoffman, seeking to interpret this 
concentrative process, asks "Why was 
there a rise in the degree of concentra-
tion of income in Brazil in the 
1960-1970 decade, primarily in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors? The 
explanation of the process must lie in 
the Brazilian model of development". 
There can be no doubt, for the time 
being, that various aspects of govern-
ment economic policy are directly linked 
with the rise in concentration: (a) "the 
value of the real minimum wage fell 
sharply during the period"; (b) "there 
was a decline in the negotiating power of 
the workers", who "were the object of 
frequent intervention" on the part of the 
State; and (c) the changes in the "system 
of compensation for unfair dismissal and 
of job security", made it easier for 
entrepreneurs to rotate staff without 
carrying out the wage readjustments or 
paying the extra remuneration for length 
of service. This "compression of wages" 
reduced the amount of resources needed 
to pay the less skilled workers and thus 
made possible a more hierarchical wage 
structure, with a great improvement in 
wages in the middle and upper levels and 
a relative drop in the wages of the 
unskilled workers. There have been 
various interpretations of this process of 
wage differentiation, as is shown, for 
example, by the disagreement between 
Langoni and Fishlow on the role of 
education in the dynamics of income 
INDICES OF WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY IN BRAZILIAN 
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Source: Instituto de Pesquisa Económico-social Aplicada (IPEA), A industrializacüo brasileira: 
diagnóstico e perspectivas, Rio de Janeiro, 1969, p. 46. 
Commenting on these and other data, the authors conclude as follows on the problem of wages: 
"The labour market situation has enabled the wages paid by the dynamic and the traditional 
industries to be brought level or at least has ensured that the wage difference between them is not 
very great (this is also visible in the service sector). In these conditions, given the differences in 
productivity, it may be assumed that the sectors which benefited most in the twin process of 
growth and concentration of income are precisely those which contain the 'more modern 
activities'". (P. 61.) 
L.C. Bresser Pereira, "El nuevo modelo brasileño de desarrollo", in Desarrollo Económico (Buenos 
Aires, vol. 14, N9 55, October-December 1974, pp. 575 etseq.) provides further information on 
the deterioration of real wages, and particularly the minimum wage, during this period. 
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distribution. In this connexion Hoffman 
observes that differences in levels of 
education "explain" only part of the 
difference, and that in any case the 
education variable is used in the Langoni 
model as a residual variable, like a sort of 
"rag-bag", since "the absence of varia-
bles such as wealth and social status of 
the family, which are in fact positively 
correlated with the educational level, 
leads to an overestimation of the 
influence of this variable". It was "the 
Government's wage policy" which 
"really helped to keep down the wages 
of illiterate workers or those with only 
primary education and by lightening the 
payrolls of the enterprises made possible 
an increase in the salaries of the 
upper-level and management employees" 
who arc certainly better educated. 
"Since 'political' variables do not enter 
into the Langoni model, much of 
government action is 'explained' by 
means of the education variable1'.20 
R. Hoffman, "Consideraciones sobre la 
evolución reciente de la distribución de la renta 
en Brasil", Nueva sociedad, N° 16, January/ 
February 1975, pp. 18-19. Again from the 
standpoint of the analysis of the Brazilian 
Government's role in income concentration, 
Fishlow has stated that "from 1967 govern-
ment policy had an adverse effect on wages 
inasmuch as real salaries rose less than the 
productivity of labour". He goes on to say that 
"government policies created a situation in 
which the persons at the very top of the 
distribution could gain in comparison with 
those below, and since the top group was well 
educated the income differential according to 
educational qualification increased". Thus 
education became a concomitant, but was not 
the cause, of the differences in income, which 
Fishlow attributes instead to government 
policies and the concentration of wealth, the 
latter being of fundamental importance in the 
creation and persistence of income inequality in 
Brazil. "There is a serious danger that the 
problem of inequality may be viewed as a 
transitory phenomenon, to be remedied by 
There has certainly been more 
divergence as regards the appraisal of the 
changes in the distributive pyramid in 
the period 1960-1970 than with regard 
to the situation reflected by the 
statistical data used by the analysts. It is 
not for us to join in this highly prolific 
polemic. To conclude our consideration 
of the Brazilian case, perhaps the best 
course is to draw up a balance-sheet of 
the positions and indicate the points on 
which the controversy seems to have 
raged most fiercely. Langoni, who has 
set himself up as defender of the process, 
has started from the assumption that the 
rapid growth of production generates 
disruptive effects in the flows of income 
and tends to concentrate them tempora-
rily, until corrective factors enter into 
play. There are basically two such factors: 
the first is the rise in employment, 
particularly in the modern sector, as 
mentioned above; the second, more 
indirect, is the growth of education, to 
which he attributes considerable correc-
tive power inasmuch as it helps to 
equalize opportunities. 
All of these points have been 
disputed. However, it could perhaps be 
said that a common theme of central 
importance for the present study emer-
ges from this debate: namely the 
government's social and economic poli-
cies. While they have been evaluated in 
different ways, there is general agree-
ment on their influence in the differen-
tial distribution of income. We shall 
return below to the problem of the 
relationship between the political régime 
growth and some modest reforms alone, and 
not as the heritage of the past accumulation of 
wealth and capital. . . Inequality should not be 
diagnosed in such a way as to exclude from the 
outset the factor which is possibly strongest: 
the redistribution of physical assets". Cf. 
A. Fishlow, ibid., pp. 29 and 45. 
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and the State and its effect on shaping 
income concentration patterns.21 
Unfortunately, income distribution 
statistics are incomplete in most 
countries and only relatively reliable 
conclusions can be drawn from them on 
the distributive situation and income 
concentration in specific years. With 
these reservations, some other Latin 
American countries may be singled out 
to illustrate further the elitist type of 
concentration: El Salvador (around 
Many studies have been made of the 
so-called "Brazilian political model", which 
began with the poHtical régime installed in 
1964 but acquired its definitive form more 
recently in 1968. These do not always agree, 
either because of the approach adopted or due 
to the influence of their value judgements on 
the choice and interpretation of facts. A 
summary and reasonably objective description 
was made recently by Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso in the foliowLig terms: "the Brazilian 
political model. . . did not cease to have an 
objective basis and to be useful to the ends of 
the triumphant political groups. The prevailing 
authoritarianism enabled the State apparatus to 
be reorganized, abolished the previous party 
system (and thereby the poHtical representation 
of the popular classes and urban workers and 
also of large sectors of the former dominant 
classes) and brought into the political process, 
on new terms, the armed forces and the social 
groups representing the monopoHstic sectors of 
the economy. These changes helped to shape 
the "economic miracle" in the form in which it 
occurred: with income concentration and social 
inequality. In addition, the economic interven-
tion of the State and foreign investment could 
more easily be combined in the authoritarian 
climate which prevailed following the disman-
tHng of the former political order . . . In sum, 
the leading sector of this power bloc is 
recruited from the armed forces and depends 
on them as a corporation, while receiving firm 
support from the technocratic sectors". 
F.H. Cardoso, Autoritarismo e Democratizaçâo, 
Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975, pages 
225-226. (Underlining added.) 
1965), Guatemala (1965), Peru (until 
1968) and Chile (since 1973).22 
The mesocratic type of concentration 
The cases which could be taken into 
consideration to illustrate this type of 
concentration correspond to a number 
of countries which, in various phases of 
their recent development, present distri-
bution situations with definitely meso-
cratic features. The examples could 
include Chile under Frei and Argentina 
in the post-peronist period between 
1955 and 1963. Other countries such as 
Uruguay (1968) also have distribution 
structures which follow the same 
pattern.2 3 The available information is 
22 The data on Peru and Chile, while still 
fragmentary, are considerably more complete 
than the data on the first two countries. On 
Peru see, in particular, Richard Webb and 
Adolfo Figueroa, La distribución del ingreso en 
el Perú, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 
1975, passim. As for Chile, the following 
studies may be mentioned, among others: 
Michael Chossudovsky, "Hacia el nuevo modelo 
económico chileno. Inflación y redistribución 
del ingreso", El trimestre económico, NQ 166, 
April-June 1975, pp.311 to 347; Ricardo 
Lagos and Oscar A. Rufatt, "MiUtary govern-
ment and real wages in Chile: A Note", Latin 
American Research Review, Vol.10, N9. 2, 
Summer 1975, pp. 139 to 146. 
23 See CEPAL, Income distribution in 
Latin America, United Nations publication, 
Sales N9 S.71.II.G.2, New York, 1972. This is 
the most thorough of the many studies on the 
topic, and it shows interesting swings in 
distribution which are related to changes in the 
poHtical situation. See also CEPAL, Economic 
development and income distribution in Argen-
tina, United Nations pubUcation, Sales 
N9 S.68.II.G.6, New York, 1968. For more 
recent and up-to-date information, see the 
publications of the Proyecto sobre medición y 
análisis de la distribución del ingreso en países 
de América Latina, CEPAL/ IBRD, Santiago, 
1974/1975, mimeo. 
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incomplete, only relatively reliable and 
often barely comparable. With these 
limitations, perhaps no other known 
examples approach closer to the meso-
cratic type of concentration than the 
cases of Venezuela, Mexico and Costa 
Rica in recent decades, countries for 
which recent information is available. 
These three countries are the cases 
which will be analysed below on the 
basis of published data and well-known 
studies both by CEPAL and obtained 
from other sources. In any event, it may 
be recalled that -as in the case of 
Brazil- the empirical analysis of the 
specific form of income distribution in 
these countries is above all a qualitative 
matter, primarily designed to illustrate 
an analytical model. In other words, our 
aim is to shed light on the problems 
raised above in connexion with the 
dynamics of income concentration in the 
process of Latin American capitalist 
growth and the forms it has taken in 
national political settings and specific 
historical situations. This methodological 
and substantive goal means that the 
presentation and study of the cases must 
necessarily be sketchy, indicating only 
those aspects of the situation which are 
considered of prime analytical impor-
tance in the model. What is of interest 
here is to stress the presence and 
influence of a number of non-economic 
factors in shaping a mesocratic type of 
concentration. 
The case of Venezuela. What is 
known about the Venezuelan experience 
is interesting in many ways because it 
shows how the mesocratic type of 
income concentration, currently preva-
lent in Venezuela as well as in other 
countries of Latin America, is constitu-
ted and how it works. The CEPAL 
general study24 mentions various histori-
cal and structural factors which have 
played a considerable part in shaping 
income distribution in that country: 
(a) a rapid, sustained growth rate over a 
long period; (b) a small "primitive" 
sector which only influences the lower 
and intermediate levels of distribution; 
(c) a rapidly-growing "modern sector" in 
which most of domestic income is 
concentrated, spearheaded by (d) a 
petroleum enclave largely under external 
control, which pays high wages and 
salaries and high prices for national 
inputs, thus raising wage levels in the 
domestic sectors; (e) this redistributive 
effect of the transfer of income from the 
petroleum enclave creates domestic 
demand, which gives rise to a sophistica-
ted market supplied in the first place 
through imports and subsequently 
through technologically-advanced substi-
tutive industrialization also paying high 
salaries as well as fat dividends to its 
owners; and finally (f) a State whose 
appropriation of income generated by 
petroleum increased considerably during 
the period, and which reallocates this 
income as investment in infrastructural 
and public works, education and social 
policies which contribute to the accelera-
ted growth of a new techno-bureaucracy 
and a rapidly-growing public productive 
sector. The State has acquired a central, 
strategic position in the Venezuelan 
economy and its importance is steadily 
increasing. 
The above-mentioned study points 
out that the crisis of the thirties harmed 
the traditional privileged minorities 
whose position was primarily based on 
24CEPAL, Income distribution in Latin 
America, op, cit., pp. 52 to 61. The data are 
mostly taken from a study carried out in 1962, 
supplemented by estimates for 1960-1970 and 
earlier years. 
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the growing and exporting of cocoa and 
coffee. Their incomes declined because 
of the sharp drop in international prices, 
while petroleum prices were climbing 
and thus strengthening the leading 
position of the petroleum sector in the 
country's economy. 
These events changed the traditional 
Venezuelan structure and led to a 
distribution of income with the 
following features: first, "the poorer half 
of the population receives a smaller 
proportion of total income than in any 
other country of the region" (p. 52). 
The lower levels obtained relatively 
lower incomes: the poorest 20 per cent 
receives scarcely 3 per cent of total 
income (as against 7 per cent in 
Argentina), although in absolute terms 
their incomes are a little higher than the 
regional average, and "these groups have 
been almost untouched by the rapid 
growth of recent years" (p. 54). The 
coefficients of inequality in Venezuela 
are very high but, in contrast with the 
rest of the region, this is caused more by 
inequality throughout the distribution 
than by the concentration of income at 
the very top of the scale (p. 52). 
Secondly, in the intermediate levels 
income rises much more rapidly than in 
most Latin American countries. This rise 
becomes very steep in the 7th, 8th and 
9th deciles of the scale. On the other 
hand, the rise at the top level is lower, as 
may be seen particularly in the 5 per 
cent at the very top of the distribution, 
whose share has declined relatively. It 
should be noted that the share of salaries 
in this top 5 per cent is the highest in the 
region (p. 60). Thus the weight of 
property in income concentration is 
considerably lower than in the countries 
belonging to the elitist type. 
Thirdly, income tends to be concen-
trated in the top half but not the very 
top 5 per cent. "The groups which have 
benefited most from the special form of 
development of the Venezuelan econo-
my are those in the top half of the 
distribution but below the very top of 
the scale . . . Both the 30 per cent above 
the median and the following 15 per 
cent receive a larger share of total 
personal income than in any other 
country of the region . . . but at the very 
top of the scale (10th decile), the 
inequality is less extreme than elsewhere 
in the region" (p. 56). 
To sum up, then, in this type of 
distribution concentration occurs in the 
higher groups but below the top of the 
scale, at the expense of the relative 
position of the top 5 per cent and of the 
lower half of the distribution, which 
becomes relatively poorer. Recent trends 
in income distribution have tended to 
strengthen this type of distribution, 
although there is also a complementary 
trend towards a higher share for other 
middle groups below those in which 
income has been most concentrated in 
recent years. The concentration is 
tending to spread downwards, but 
slowly. 
The explanation of this pattern is 
very tentative and sketchy. The big 
foreign enterprises have lucrative advan-
tages in petroleum which have enabled 
them to pay higher salaries "to avoid 
either a political or an economic threat 
to their position" (p. 57). However, 
there has been constant political and 
economic pressure on them from the 
State and other circles, thus causing a 
considerable transfer of income towards 
the domestic sector which has led to the 
strengthening of the State and the 
diversification of the national economy. 
This interplay with the foreign petro-
leum companies has fostered the emer-
gence of strong political leadership in the 
hands of a powerful State, a nationalistic 
ideology and an active and energetic 
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political class capable of articulating 
group interests and promoting their 
economic demands on the foreign 
enclave. It has also led to a "political 
market" which is relatively open and 
dynamic, where the various social forces 
take shape and demands are fought out, 
legitimated by "broader", but by no 
means full political participation.25 The 
political class and electoral consultation 
are thus of fundamental importance in 
the formulation of policies and the 
definition of the style of development. 
All this is true of contemporary 
Venezuelan society which, contrary to 
the prevailing trends in Latin America, 
has been able not only to preserve but 
also to develop a civil and democratic 
political style with increasing participa-
tion, undoubtedly favoured by the 
dynamism of its flourishing external 
sector. Fundamental in this evolution 
has been the fact that the social sectors 
and groups which have gained power 
have been able to express themselves and 
have their way, thus creating a peculiar 
distribution structure in which their 
demands are clearly reflected in the type 
of income concentration. This is a 
typical mesocratic concentration of 
income, which expresses the predomi-
nance of a power structure in which the 
presence of a political class, a coalition 
of urban and rural, civil and military 
middle sectors (bureaucrats, professio-
nals, entrepreneurs, intermediaries, etc.) 
nuclei of organized urban workers, and 
the mobilization of broader sectors of 
the population have helped to create a 
pluralistic and stable political régime 
which enjoys reasonable legitimacy. All 
this gives it a foundation of consensus 
25 These terms are used in the acceptance 
given them by G. Germani, Política y sociedad 
en una época de transición, Buenos Aires, 
Paidos, 1962, Chapter V, pp. 147 to 162. 
which is unusual in the present Latin 
American political setting. 
The case of Mexico. The structure 
and trends of income distribution in 
Mexico present striking similarities with 
Venezuela.26 Both countries are good 
illustrations of the mesocratic type of 
concentration. Mexico also has the 
advantage of possessing data and studies 
on income distribution going back to 
1950. Table 3 shows the structure and 
evolution of the distribution from that 
year. 
A rapid survey of the preceding table 
and of other data in the above-
mentioned study27 permits a number of 
important conclusions. First, the relative 
position of the lower half of the 
distribution declines throughout the 
period. This drop is particularly sharp in 
the case of the poorest 20 per cent, 
whose share grows at a rate three and a 
half times below the national average 
(1.2 per cent in comparison with 4.1 per 
cent). 
26 The similarity is explicitly recognized in 
CEPAL, Income distribution in Latin America, 
op. cit.: "The distribution of income in Mexico 
is basically quite similar to that just described 
for Venezuela. Minimum incomes are again low 
and the poorer half of the population receives a 
very small proportion of total income. There is 
also the considerable inequality throughout the 
distribution . . . the rise at the very top is again 
relatively smaller and although the top 5 per 
cent receives a considerably larger share of the 
total than was the case in Venezuela, the share 
is still smaller than elsewhere in the region and 
the inequality is due less to the concentration 
at the very top of the scale. The similarity 
between the income distribution of the two 
countries can be readily seen. In the various 
ways of viewing the distribution, the values 
calculated for Mexico and for Venezuela 
consistently fall close to each other on the 
scale" (p. 61). 
27 CEPAL, Income distribution in Latin 
America, op. cit. 
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Table 3 
MEXICO: INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY STRATA FROM 1950 
Income strata 
Lowest 20 per cent 
Next 20 per cent 
Middle 30 per cent 
Upper middle 20 per cent 
Top 10 per cent 
of which; 
(lower 5 per cent) 
(upper 5 per cent) 
Rate of growth of per capita 













































Sources: For the series 1950-1963 the data were taken from the study by Ingenia M. de Navarrete, 
"La distribución del ingreso en México: tendencias y perspectivas", in Víctor L. Urquidi 
et. al, El perfil de México en 1980, Mexico City, Siglo XXI, 1970, vol. I, table 2, p. 37. 
The data for 1970 are taken from unpublished CEPAL estimates and are included as 
more recent illustrations, although they are not strictly comparable with the data for the 
earlier years on methodological grounds; with these limitations, they clearly confirm the 
trends already noted. 
Secondly, the lower intermediate 
stratum, which includes up to the 30 per 
cent above the median, retains its share 
of total income and grows at a rate 
equivalent to the national average. In 
other words, it maintains its relative 
position. 
Third, the share of the upper middle 
stratum formed by the 15 per cent 
below ÚÍQ top 5 per cent grows at a 
much higher rate than the overall 
average. It is in this group that there is 
the greatest concentration of increases in 
income during the period. 
Fourth, the top 5 per cent clearly 
loses ground, dropping from 40 per cent 
to 29 per cent between 1950 and 1970. 
This decline contrasts sharply with the 
rise which occurs in the 5 per cent 
immediately below, whose share of 
income rises from 9 per cent to 12 per 
cent (i.e., by one-third).28 
Finally, a glance at the overall trend 
shows that the share of the upper middle 
strata increases at the expense of the two 
extremes of the distribution, the poorest 
and the richest, thus clearly illustrating 
2 8 Thus, the position and trends of the top 
strata and, also, in general, the lower half, are 
the opposite of what has been noted above in 
the case of Brazil. 
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what we have called in this study the 
mesocratic model.29 
The same CEPAL study goes on to 
note that "the share of the top income 
g r o u p . . . varies with the social and 
institutional structure in any particular 
country".30 
In an earlier CEPAL study31 there is 
a review of the factors and processes 
which helped to shape the present 
profile of the distribution of income in 
Mexico. The study notes that in the 
1940s the changes led to greater 
inequality in the distribution of income 
and a widening of the gap between the 
different socioeconomic categories of 
the population: the average incomes of 
entrepreneurs rose more than the average 
increments of wage-earners and export 
agriculture grew, while the situation of 
the wage-earners and small rural produ-
cers deteriorated in absolute and relative 
terms (p. 202). Industrialization gained 
strength in the 1950s and came to the 
forefront of economic growth. The 
overriding feature in more recent years 
has been the strengthening of public 
action as a factor influencing the 
characteristics of the distribution 
(p. 203). 
The present profile of the distribu-
tion is characterized by a number of 
features and processes. First, the internal 
structural differences, the differences 
among wage and salary earners 
29 "Growth has benefited primarily those 
in the upper part of the distribution but below 
the top; and both those at the very top and 
those at the bottom have seen their share of 
total income decline in the process". (CEPAL, 
Income distribution in Latin America, op. cit., 
p. 64.) 
30 Ibid, p. 64. 
31 CEPAL, Estudios sobre la distribución 
del ingreso en América Latina, op. cit. 
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(according to the sector, specialization 
and degree of modernization of the 
productive unit) and those among 
entrepreneurs (small and large, traditio-
nal and modern producers, etc.) have 
widened. 
Second, the State has been imple-
menting industrial promotion policies 
which favour large-scale enterprises at 
the expense of other sectors, particularly 
small family agricultural concerns. 
Third, the gaps between salary levels 
have been widening, particularly 
between 1940 and 1950 —a process 
heavily influenced by government price-
and wage-fixing policies, which conso-
lidated the relative deterioration of 
salaries and their greater internal stratifi-
cation. 
Fourth, growth was rapid and 
sustained throughout the period, but in 
the initial phase it was accompanied by 
continuous inflation and big sectoral 
differences in growth-rates, partly caused 
by the great contrasts within the process 
of technological modernization. 
Fifth, in this situation a "worker 
aristocracy" has emerged, in the form of 
the highly-paid employees of the 
modern, high-productivity enterprises, 
who are unionized and linked to the 
State's political apparatus. There is also a 
stratum of executives, technical experts 
and professionals with close ties with the 
more dynamic productive sectors and 
the State administration.32 
32 An interesting and illustrative study 
about the formation of the social awareness of 
a group of supervisors and semi-skilled workers 
in the process of becoming conspicuous 
members of a "worker aristocracy" may be 
found in J.A. Kahl, "Tres tipos de trabajadores 
industriales mexicanos", in J.A. Kahl (éd.), La 
industrialización en América Latina, Mexico 
City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965, 
pp. 217 to 224. 
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Sixth, towards the end of the period 
(particularly in the 1960s) the Govern-
ment has followed redistributive policies 
which expanded education, health, social 
security, housing and other services, 
These services also represent new job 
opportunities for the bureaucratic, 
technical and professional middle 
sectors. The effects of these policies in 
the poorer sectors appear to have been 
very limited.33 
The original pattern of income 
distribution was conditioned by various 
processes. In the first place there was the 
"Mexican revolution", which radically 
changed the agricultural social structure 
and, in particular, the régime of land 
tenure and the concentration of land in 
latifundios. The agricultural oligarchy 
was practically destroyed, and along 
with it its economic power and the 
traditional class structure of which it had 
been the main component and prop. 
33 "It is striking that all these efforts (the 
social services policies) have not come to be 
adequately reflected in any improvement of 
income distribution by levels, which, as we have 
seen, was limited to the intermediate groups 
and did not extend to the lower income 
strata . . . This suggests in part that the 
redistribution policy was more efficient with 
respect to the wage-earners whose income 
concentration was (previously) greater, and 
who were better organized and primarily urban, 
than in the sectors made up of the lower strata 
of the distribution, primarily wage-earners in 
agriculture and specific services", as well as 
independent producers, more than half of 
whom (53 per cent) are in the lower half of the 
distribution. Cf. CEPAL Estudios. . . , op. cit., 
pp. 227-228. (Underlining added). On this 
problem, see also the well-known study by 
Pablo González Casanova, "Sociedad Plural y 
Desarrollo: el caso de México", in J.A. Kahl, 
op. cit., pp. 262-273; and also his book La 
democracia en México, Mexico City, ERA, 
1965, Chaps. V and VI. 
Second, no less important was the 
process of institutionalization and the 
shaping of a political régime centered on 
a government party which seems to have 
become one with the State, as it has a 
great capacity to articulate and represent 
very varied and often contradictory 
interests. 
Third, although the nationalization 
of the petroleum industry during the 
Cardenista period was an important step 
in the development of the Mexican 
revolution, more recently foreign invest-
ment and transnational corporations 
have acquired increasing weight in 
activities ranging from some key indus-
trial sectors (motor vehicles) to impor-
tant services like hotel-keeping and 
tourism. In addition, commercial and 
financial links with the United States are 
very close. 
Finally, the State has played a 
central role in all this process; its action 
has had a decisive effect on the present 
shape of the Mexican economy and, 
above all, on the preponderance of 
certain groups within it. A new sector of 
entrepreneurs and industrial executives 
(national and foreign), a large techno-
bureaucracy and a stratum of high-
income technical experts and professio-
nals, allied with the union leaders of the 
urban workers in the modern sector and 
of the agricultural workers, together 
with other middle sectors in trade and 
services, have managed to consolidate a 
stable political régime through an institu-
tionalized alliance in à political appara-
tus (the PRI), which represents a relati-
vely broad social base articulated with an 
influential political class.34 
34 The specific profile of income concen-
tration in Mexico has caught the attention of 
analysts of Mexican economic development and 
politics. One author who has reviewed much of 
the extensive literature on the subject reaches 
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The case of Costa Rica. Costa Rica 
offers some interesting variants of the 
mesocratic type of concentration. Table 
4 shows the changes in income distribu-
tion by strata in the course of a decade. 
The utmost caution must be obser-
ved in interpreting these data because of 
the variety of sources from which they 
are taken - whose compatibility is not 
examined in the study in question- and 
also because of the aggregation in the 
centre where very diverse and heteroge-
neous income strata are grouped together. 
All the same, a clear trend may be seen 
the following conclusions: 'in the last 30 years, 
a large part of the bill for rapid industrialization 
has been paid by large reductions in the 
consumption of the great majority of Mexican 
society situated at the very botton of the 
income scale. Between 1940 and the early 
1970s, the rich in Mexico have become richer 
and the poor poorer.. . Two generalizations 
may be made about the course of economic 
development in Mexico. The first is that no 
other Latin American political system has 
provided greater rewards to its new industrial 
and agro-business elite" or done "so little 
directly on behalf of the poorest quarter of its 
population . . .". "What seems to have occurred 
in Mexico after 1940 is that one particular 
social group, a new agricultural-industrial elite, 
has been permanently favoured by government 
policy" . . . However, "the Mexican develop-
ment strategy to date has triumphed because 
the socio-political development of the country 
has favoured rather than obstructed govern-
ment policy and the private sector's response in 
the interests of higher growth. On various 
occasions, other Latin American countries have 
adopted similar policies; however, in general 
these policies have been the victims of social 
and political pressures which, in Mexico, have 
been better contained". The author points out 
that "in recent years there has been a clear drop 
in the concentration of income in the top 5 per 
cent of Mexican families" and that those 
benefited by development are the groups 
immediately below; "thus the present political 
system has averted an increasing concentration 
of political power in the hands of a few 
unchanging individuals... (and this reveals) the 
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towards concentration beneath the very 
top of the scale. In addition, the study 
on which table 4 is based indicates that 
concentration is greater in the capital 
and lower in the rural zones, and these 
differences have been growing bigger. In 
the national development plan of Costa 
Rica35 these income variations are 
attributed to the increasing complexity 
of the economic system. " In the high 
strata there is greater diversification" at 
the same time as "a consolidation of 
their social position by the concentra-
tion of wealth in the rural and urban 
sectors" which has increased in recent 
years. The middle strata have grown and 
improved their share of income because 
of "the existence of strong associations 
promoting and defending their 
demands". "The situation is very diffe-
rent for the lower strata. Clearly, some 
have improved their position inasmuch 
as they have managed to become 
incorporated in the dynamic sectors of 
the economy, but it is also true that a 
considerable portion continues to have 
rotating nature of the elite within the political 
system, and shows that there is a trend towards 
less income concentration in the highest income 
groups". In other words, he asserts that it is the 
style of Mexican politics, notwithstanding the 
concentrative trends it engenders, which has 
been successful in avoiding the oligarchization 
that, would have occurred if political power had 
been frozen due to a lack of adequate rotation 
of its elites, and if income had been 
concentrated in the very top group, thus 
strengthening its position in the prevailing 
structure of domination. This certainly did not 
happen, and it is precisely in this fact that one 
may perhaps find much of the explanation for 
the unusual political stability achieved by 
Mexican society over the last 40 years. (Roger 
D. Hansen, La política del desarrollo mexicano, 
Mexico City, Siglo XXI, 1974, pp. 96, 97, 117, 
119, 134 and 236.) 
35 Annex III, 1974, p. 6. 
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Table 4 
COSTA RICA: VARIATIONS IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
Income strata 1961 1971 
Bottom 20 per cent (1st and 2nd decile) 
Intermediate 60 per cent (3rd to 8th decile) 
10 per cent below the top decile (9th decile) 
Top 10 per cent (10th decile) 











Source: V.H. Céspedes S., Costa Rica: La distribución del ingreso y el consumo de algunos 
alimentos, Serie de Economía y Estadística, N9 45, Universidad de Costa Rica, San José, 
1973, table 13, p. 58. 
an unsatisfactory standard of living", 
and that "unemployment and under-
employment continue to run at high 
levels, and a quarter of the total 
population receive clearly inadequate 
incomes". Elsewhere in the same 
study,36 after repeating that "the 
position of the elite in the economic 
power structure has been strengthened", 
emphasis is laid on the high growth of 
the dependent middle strata, both 
private and public, due to the fact that 
"their high organizational level and 
lobbying capacity in the political system 
have enabled these strata to absorb a 
considerable proportion of the national 
income.37 
36 Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, op. cit., 
Annex I, "El cierre de la brecha social", pp. 22 
to 24. This annex was prepared by A. Gurrieri 
and P. Sainz. 
3 7 After the present study had been 
completed, we came across the excellent work 
by A. Figueroa and R. Weisskoff, "Visión de las 
pirámides sociales: Distribución del ingreso en 
América Latina", Ensayos ECIEL, N° 1, 
November 1974. The authors made a diagnosis 
of the situation which coincides with our own. 
In the first place, they identified "two patterns 
of trends. The first reflects a gain by the richest 
5 or 10 per cent and a relative loss by the 
poorer 90 per cent. . . The formation of 
'burgeois society' is reflected in the second 
model, in which the bottom 60 per cent and 
the top 5 per cent give up some of their share 
of the income in the process of the growth of 
the 'middle class'..." Their examples include 
Brazil in the first case, and in the second, 
Mexico. They go on to observe that the 
prevailing style of development is not a 
redistributive force for greater overall equity, 
but on the contrary "whatever the pattern of 
'redistribution' during the growth process, one 
thing is clear from these empirical results: 
development entaUs a decline in the relative 
share of the bottom 60 per cent", i.e., the 
poorest strata. "In the case of Peru, estimates 
have been made on the basis of trends in the 
real income of the different social groups in the 
period 1950-1966. The result is that those 
employed in the modern sector, which 
constitutes the richest quartile, increase their 
real income more than the other groups. . . 
After 1968, when the present military govern-
ment began a series of reforms, the trend has 
been towards a transfer of income from the 
richest 1 per cent to the rest of the top 
quartile." In any event, they confirm the earlier 
assertion about the pauperization caused by 
growth. ". . . The five countries examined show 
that in every case the poorest 60 per cent 
suffered relative losses in their share of national 
income" (pp. 90, 91 and Î12). 
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4. 
Types of income concentration 
and political régime 
Economic explanations, even in a histo-
rical perspective, provide a good starting 
point when attempting to describe the 
specific features and general stability of 
the structure of income distribution 
within an economic and social system 
which, like the capitalist one, imprints a 
very clear pattern on it.38 The private 
appropriation of the means of produc-
tion, the concentration of ownership and 
the régime of remunerated work consti-
tute solid structural bases on which a 
variety of possible income-distribution 
pyramids may rest. These bases form a 
relatively broad framework which can 
accommodate different distributive 
patterns. However, the specific form of 
income distribution will be closely 
linked to the dynamics of power, or the 
social forces which control the State and 
thus the styles of development which the 
State promotes. 
We have already seen that authors 
like Kuznets and Lewis have indicated 
that according to the experience of the 
There is certainly much evidence to 
show that in conditions of hegemonic stability 
(in other words, in the absence of social 
revolutions) the basic structure of the capitalist 
distribution of income in the long term 
possesses very great continuity. Titmuss showed 
this in the case of England. Cf. R. Titmuss, 
Income Distribution and Social Change, Allen 
& Unwin, 1962. More recently, a somewhat 
similar assertion has been made in the case of 
Colombia: "In general terms, it may be said 
that income distribution did not change 
significantly between the 1930s and the 
1960s", M. Urrutia, "Distribución del ingreso 
en Colombia", Revista Internacional del Traba-
jo, Vol 93, N° 2, March-April 1976, p. 232. 
original industrialized countries the 
concentration of income inherent in 
capitalist development necessarily 
occurred at the very top of the scale 
because that was where savings 
and, complementarity, investment were 
greatest.39 Thus only this top group 
converts income into productive wealth, 
in proportions which are large but 
difficult to estimate exactly.40 
This is the essential mechanism of 
classic capitalist accumulation during the 
take-off stage, at the beginning of the 
industrialization and technological 
modernization of the economy. On the 
basis of this argument, "premature 
redistributionism" has been roundly 
rejected as contrary to the logic of 
capitalist development, since any expan-
sion of the distributive base would 
destroy the essential dynamic elements 
of the system and the economy would 
be condemned to incurable stagnation. 
Hence the spurning of the "populist" 
solutions which are considered to be 
redistributionist in substance since they 
work against the private accumulation of 
capital. 
39C.G. Langoni forcefully reasserted this 
argument not long ago: "One of our central 
arguments is that the acceleration of growth 
inevitably leads to a higher degree of 
concentration" {op. cit., p. 214). 
40 Cf. S. Kuznets, who argues that in the 
United States the top decile accounts for 
practically all personal savings, and the top S 
per cent for over two thirds of the total 
{op. cit., p. 7). 
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Nevertheless, the studies of income 
distribution in the majority of Latin 
American countries show that the 
growing concentration at the very top 
is not inevitable, and that some countries 
have achieved long periods of rapid 
economic growth in conditions where 
the rise in income is concentrated in the 
groups immediately below the very top, 
so that the benefits of growth are thus 
more widely spread. This makes possible 
a broader consensus which can hold 
together and facilitate the working of a 
more democratic political style, although 
it is still nothing more than a "limited 
participation" version of democracy. 
This type of capitalist concentra-
tion, which we have called mesocratic, 
does not necessarily come after elitist 
concentration as the next stage in a 
"natural" process, as appears to have 
happened in the highly industrialized 
capitalist countries.41 
On the contrary, in Latin America 
two types of income concentration 
coexist in countries which are in 
relatively similar stages of modernization 
of their productive forces, although their 
political styles differ considerably. What 
is more, it may be seen that both types 
of concentration may occur in a single 
country at different times, without 
considerable qualitative changes having 
occurred in the economic structure. 
As illustrations, one may mention 
Brazil before and after 1964, Chile over 
the last decade and Uruguay at various 
41 The experience of these countries should 
be viewed with interest but with caution. In 
relation to these problems, historical extrapo-
lations have been shown to be often misleading 
and false, since they have been based on factors 
and conditions which are supposedly constant 
but are not so in fact. The "ceteris paribus" 
fallacy is often difficult to avoid and 
customarily leads to mistaken conclusions. 
stages over the last 20 years. Thus the 
difference lies in the pattern and 
dynamics of the political régime, which 
is the factor that "explains" the 
transition from one type of income 
concentration to another. Of course, the 
changes in the distribution which have 
occurred in these countries, like those 
which have applied in other countries 
which, like Mexico and Venezuela, have 
more stable structures of mesocratic 
concentration, have not been the mere 
consequence of conjunctural variations 
or intersectoral changes in economic 
production, nor still less of inescapable 
historical trends in the technological 
modernization and organization of the 
economy. 
These changes in the pattern of 
income distribution are essentially politi-
cal in nature. Whether one is describing, 
for example, the rise or fall of a populist 
régime, or the formation of new alliances 
of social forces, the problem directly 
concerns the political régime. This is so 
because in the new circumstances there 
tends to be a profound change in the real 
functions of the State and the orienta-
tion of public policies in respect of 
development, which may perhaps lead to 
a new style of development accompanied 
by different forms of income concen-
tration. 
The correlation between the political 
régime and the profile of income 
concentration is certainly very close. The 
elitist and mesocratic types of concentra-
tion coexist with political régimes which 
are specific to them and may largely be 
explained through them. In general, the 
forms of concentration are closely linked 
to the degree of modernization of the 
economy, the organization of civil 
society, the levels and forms of political 
participation, and the influence of 
certain groups over State action, as well 
as the structure assumed by the State 
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within this framework. Income concen-
tration depends, in the last analysis, on 
the political capacity of the "managing 
minorities" to "oblige the majority of 
the population to accept increasing 
social inequality".42 In other words, on 
the degrees of authoritarianism and 
negotiation which coexist in the political 
régime. 
The first thing to be said of the 
elitist type concerns its links with 
economic and social modernization. Two 
subtypes should be distinguished, 
according to the degree of moderniza-
tion of the society. The first could be 
called traditional elitist. Here, the 
income concentration is due above all to 
the accumulation of ownership 
-primarily rural latifundia type of 
ownership of land or mines— in an 
economy where the primary sector 
remains in the productive apparatus and 
hence in the composition of the national 
product. The features of this subtype of 
income concentration are highly specific, 
since they are related to a little-
diversified socio-economic structure and 
to forms of social domination which are 
severely hierarchized and dependent on 
the concentration of land-owning or 
mining wealth. This is a case of 
oligarchy, which has perhaps never 
existed in a pure form and which largely 
disappeared from the Latin American 
political scene some time ago. 
The specific social situations in the 
countries of the region represent com-
plex variants of declining oligarchic 
elements coexisting with more modern 
forms of economic production and social 
domination. This more mixed subtype 
could be called modern elitist. It is 
C. Furtado, O mito do desenvolvimento 
económico, Paz e Terra, Rio de Janeiro, 1974, 
p. 88. 
CEPAL REVIEW / Second half of 1976 
characterized by a more heterogeneous 
and perhaps more complex relationship 
between the productive and social forces 
which exert pressure -invariably 
conflicting— on the distribution of 
income. 
In either case, the income concentra-
tion at the top of the scale always 
depends on a certain element of 
coercion, either latent or open, which 
must be exercised forcefully and impla-
cably. It is perhaps in the type of 
coercion that a clearer division can be 
established between the traditional and 
modern political forms of elitist concen-
tration. But since such a distinction is of 
little practical importance for the purpo-
ses of this study, it may be considered 
that the above observations suffice to 
make our point, and a more thorough 
analysis of the question is therefore not 
justified. 
Thus, any mention below of the 
elitist type refers primarily to the 
modern variant based on a certain level 
of technological modernization and 
diversification of production and on the 
existence of social formation made up of 
varied and not always homogeneous 
social forces with different levels of 
organization, which can join together in 
many possible ways; that is why the 
political régime becomes complex, dyna-
mic and unstable. 
Elitist concentration is a type of 
distribution which calls for more than 
the manipulation of political and ideolo-
gical resources to control the shaping of 
public opinion and the political beha-
viour or the mass of the population. It 
also calls for the definition and promo-
tion of development strategies which can 
channel the growth of money income 
produced by rapid growth of the 
economy and by "controlled" inflation 
whose effects can be exploited by the 
group controlling State policy, either 
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from within as technocrats, or from 
outside, in the domestic or foreign 
so-called private sector. 
This is possible only if these groups 
are sufficiently important within the 
State and the more sensitive decision-
making centres to be able to influence 
the complex machinery of fundamental 
economic and social relations (allocation 
of resources for investment and con-
sumption, prices and wages policies, 
taxation and fiscal policy, social policy, 
organization and expression of the 
demands of the labour force, etc.) and 
the formation and orientation of social 
forces in such a way that they favour 
their own particular interests and politi-
cal objectives. Hence the elitist type 
must necessarily be more authoritarian 
and frequently adopts forms of military 
domination. 
Clearly, an "austerity policy" entai-
ling price rises and the holding down of 
wages to contain inflation and stimulate 
productive growth cannot be carried out 
in just any social situation. Such a policy 
does not win elections and generally 
does not generate spontaneous consensus 
in support of the development style 
promoted. It often triggers off strong 
social reactions, and it clearly wins less 
consensus than a populist redistribution 
policy with large increases in the popular 
share of total income. 
The elitist type of concentration, in 
this respect, tends to have a positive 
effect on the side of higher employment 
(public infrastructure works, housing 
plans, etc.), but at the same time it 
depresses the incomes of the dependent 
workers, lowering the real wages of the 
majority of workers and employees. 
Naturally, this is a very difficult strategy 
to carry out without a political régime 
which possesses the nesessary authority to 
apply the coercion such policies require. 
Hence the importance of the military 
factor among the social forces which 
promote and support the prevailing 
style. 
A political régime. compatible with 
this distribution policy must necessarily 
be more authoritarian and coercive and 
will probably often have to rely on open 
repression to contain the pressures of the 
social groups left on the sidelines of the 
economic process, whose aspirations and 
demands rise, at least potentially, with 
the process of modernization. 
For many, there is a clear contradic-
tion between two factors: on the one hand, 
there is the increasing modernization of 
social attitudes, which means that social 
groups and strata of considerable strate-
gic and functional importance in the 
economic structure are more prone and 
better able to formulate demands and 
ask questions, especially as their aspira-
tions for greater well-being are strongly 
stimulated by the demonstration effect 
and by international patterns of con-
sumption, while on the other hand, the 
material benefits they receive under an 
elitist style of development are scanty. 
It is not really the groups in the 
lower layers of the income pyramid who 
feel most deeply the effects of this 
contradiction. It is not they, by any 
means, who exert the greatest pressure, 
but rather the socially-mobile middle 
sectors who have acquired professional 
qualifications through the educational 
system and do not feel suitably rewarded 
by a development style which in one 
way or another concentrates the 
increases in income at the very top of 
the distribution. The existence of mino-
rities which enjoy privileges under the 
situation and can take advantage of the 
State to appropriate the larger income 
generated by rapid economic growth 
outrages them, rousing them to a variety 
of political and social reactions. 
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In such circumstances, it seems 
difficult for the political régime corres-
ponding to this style of elitist concentra-
tion to be legitimated and its public 
policy endorsed by a consensus of an 
electoral nature. It is equally difficult for 
it to tolerate the working of a political 
market-place in which the great national 
problems are openly discussed. Political 
pluralism and the public discussion of 
different options can hardly be recon-
ciled with the predominant political 
style in a society containing severe 
contradictions and social tensions which 
the political régime must check or 
neutralize. 
A survey of the Latin American 
scene shows that, where this type of 
concentration predominates, elections 
are either not held or else have no direct 
function or real influence in the 
appointment of the political leaders and 
the fixing of the political orientations of 
the State. Instead, the State comes to 
depend on a civilian-military techno-
bureaucracy which becomes autonomous 
and neither answers for its decisions 
before political entities involving popular 
representation (parliaments, parties, 
etc.), nor feels the need to justify its 
actions electorally. 
These are the conditions in which 
the more extreme versions of "deve-
lopmentalism" may arise, where econo-
mic growth becomes an end in itself, 
while the distribution of its benefits to 
the majority of the population is 
postponed for a long time, even though 
the growth rates may be very high. The 
elitist styles of concentration are essen-
tially developmentalist, or incrementalist 
if one prefers that term. The final 
justification of income concentration at 
the top is economic growth, and next to 
high growth rates of the product the 
other problems may be considered 
secondary or, in any case, may be 
postponed until the corrective dynamism 
of the market and the system can deal 
with them. 
The style of development which 
leads to concentration at the top, 
primarily at the expense of the centre, 
cannot take place without the blocking 
and destructuring of the social sectors 
capable of questioning it, because the 
social tensions it creates are very strong 
and must be contained if it is to function 
efficiently. The formation of political 
opposition must therefore be averted by 
disarticulating the labour force's capaci-
ty to exert pressure, controlling public 
opinion and ideological discussion, and 
checking the emergent social and poli-
tical movements which might channel 
the demands of the broader social 
sectors. 
In fact the elitist political régime 
consists of a coalition of minorities made 
up of little more than 5 per cent of the 
population, although with a varying 
degree of support from broader sectors. 
In general, it comprises the domestic and 
foreign industrial entrepreneurs, techno-
crats and professionals, and entrepre-
neurs in trade and services, in alliance 
with traditional property-owning sectors. 
What is really decisive in this type of 
political régime, however, is the military 
presence which holds it together and 
backs it up with the weight of its 
coercive power. 
In sum, once a certain degree of 
productive development has been 
reached, elitist concentration is insepara-
ble from a political régime which 
possesses great authority and exercises it 
to implement a development style whose 
various strategies are all aimed at a form 
of developmentalism designed to secure 
a very high rate of economic growth and 
technological modernization, on the 
basis of ever-increasing participation of 
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foreign capital and a high rate of private 
savings and productive investment. 
The supposedly necessary condition 
to achieve these ends is a high concentra-
tion of income at the peak of the 
distribution. The sociopolitical require-
ments are a politically disarticulated and 
demobilized society, with a political 
class which has lost its functions, 
influence and power, and has been 
heavily discredited so that, at least 
temporarily, its capacity to promote the 
formation of a broadly-based political 
will has become almost negligible. A 
modernizing technobureaucracy occupies 
strategic positions within the State and 
partially replaces the political class in its 
decision-making functions, taking on 
responsibility for the implementation of 
development policies with the backing of 
the authority of the State and without 
the political supervision of parties and 
parliaments. The State's capacity to 
mould this style of development stems 
primarily from its coercive power and 
the rationalizing activities of the techno-
bureaucracy. This capacity is strengthened 
by the inert presence of a demobilized 
and disorganized labour force, with large 
sectors of the population fighting to 
obtain work, thus bringing down salaries 
and undermining still further the 
workers' limited capacity to exert 
pressure and to negotiate in the face of 
the demands of the entrepreneurs and 
the coercion of the State. 
These conditions —and others which 
in the interest of brevity we shall not 
mention- make possible the success of 
the policies designed to concentrate 
income and wealth at the very top, as 
may be seen in some Latin American 
countries. However, it is hard to judge 
the long-term continuity of this type of 
régime, because it depends on conti-
nuous growth and implies high social and 
political costs which increase as the 
economy becomes more dynamic and 
society more modernized. In these 
circumstances, the political demands of 
the masses and of socially articulated 
groups may be hard to contain or check, 
especially if a situation of economic 
stagnation should arise. Any compromise 
solution would then call for adjustments 
in the allocation of incomes which could 
rapidly lead, for example, to a mesocra-
tic kind of spread in the distribution 
pyramid. 
The features of the mesocratic type 
of income concentration contrast consi-
derably with those of the elitist type 
described above. While, as we have seen, 
in the latter the concentration of income 
in the richest five per cent of the 
population is very marked and mainly 
occurs at the expense of the strata in the 
centre of the distribution pyramid, in 
mesocratic concentration the greatest 
accumulation in the course of economic 
growth occurs instead in the upper 
middle group immediately below the top 
five per cent. In this case, the pattern is 
that while much of the growth of 
income produced by the expansion of 
production is concentrated in the upper 
middle groups, the relative position of 
the two extremes worsens, and there is a 
considerable decline in their share. 
The two types of concentration 
represent very different modes of inco-
me distribution, particularly with regard 
to which groups are hurt or benefited, 
the economic characteristics of the 
growth and the social forces directing 
and promoting it. 
The basic question here is to 
determine the conditions of occurrence 
of this type of concentration, which 
appears to be atypical with respect to 
the dynamics of classical capitalism. The 
historical data furnished by Kuznets 43 
43 See S. Kuznets, op. cit., page 3 et seq. 
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clearly show that the normal situation in 
the early stages in the countries of 
original capitalist development was one 
of high elitist concentration, slowly and 
progressively (over two or more genera-
tions) passing to a more mesocratic 
structure of concentration. Why, then, 
do some Latin American countries which 
also appear to be at the take-off stage 
and are reaching the threshold esta-
blished by Paujert nevertheless have a 
more elitist type of distribution profile? 
Following the line of analysis adop-
ted for elitist concentration, we shall 
now make a few remarks on the 
sociopolitical conditions for the emer-
gence and continuity of mesocratic 
concentration, based on the descriptive 
material given above. 
Mesocratic income concentration is 
characterized by a more open and 
pluralistic political régime. Effective 
political participation is greater, and 
both political succession and the conti-
nuity and legitimation of the govern-
ment depend t on popular elections, at 
which a variety of political options 
compete. Parliamentary discussion, nego-
tiation and political compromise, where 
a political class with influence and 
prestige has great weight, are the 
essential machinery in the process of 
formulating the strategies to define and 
implement the prevailing style of deve-
lopment. In régimes of this kind a large 
techno bureaucracy still exists, but its 
field of action is more limited and less 
autonomous, since it is under the control 
of a deliberative, pluralistic and consen-
sual political régime and an autonomous 
and powerful political class. It would 
therefore be more proper to speak of a 
modernized bureaucracy rather than a 
teçhno-bureaucracy, because it lacks the 
latter's decisive autonomy. 
Perhaps the most significant feature 
of the mesocratic power structure is the 
weakening or disappearance of the 
traditional oligarchy or élite in which 
much of the wealth was concentrated 
through its ownership or latifundia, 
sources of unearned income or financial 
and speculative assets, and which 
weighed heavily in the concentration of 
income. In Mexico, the Maderista revo-
lution destroyed this traditional land-
owning class, while in Venezuela the 
crisis of the thirties and the oil boom 
greatly reduced its previous preeminence 
in the Venezuelan economy and State. 
What disappears along with this class is 
the great historical original concentra-
tion of wealth and income, which is a 
typical aspect of elitist concentration 
and which has enabled this traditional 
wealth-owning sector to maintain consi-
derable weight, perhaps not so much in 
the economy, since its relative impor-
tance declines, but rather in the political 
sphere, where it controlled important 
sources of traditional and local power 
largely deriving from the ownership of 
rural property and territorial sway. 
The alliance of social forces which 
formulates and promotes the mesocratic 
style from within the State has a broader 
coverage and is more diversified than the 
social basis of the elitist style. In the first 
place, it may be recalled that in it the 
margin for the play of politics is 
considerably wider. Secondly, the weight 
of the upper middle sectors is predomi-
nant because the mesocratic type is 
dominated by the political class, the 
bureaucracies, professional associations, 
employers' associations, top union mana-
gement and, last but by no means least, 
the armed forces. All these sectors 
combine their interests in order to define 
the political style. Finally, perhaps the 
difference in the social composition of 
the dominant groups is not as important 
as the difference in the nature of their 
political dynamics and the role of the 
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State. In other words, the real difference 
lies in the more consensual and pluralis-
tic nature of the mesocratic type, which 
goes hand in hand with a political régime 
which is more open to direct negotiation 
and to the interplay of interests of 
organized and mobilized groups which 
compete in the political arena on crucial 
income policy issues. 
In general, the mesocratic type of 
concentration stems from a political 
society with higher levels of participa-
tion and a political dimension more open 
to the pressures of the various organized 
interest sectors, whose weight in 
decision-making may come to be consi-
derable. However, there are structural 
limitations which, for one reason or 
another, restrict access to the channels 
and positions of social participation 
which are of importance for political 
decisions. Thus, for example, the great 
availability of unemployed, underemplo-
yed and badly employed labour slows 
the build-up of social forces and their 
claims, by introducing an element of 
instability in the jobs of the groups in 
the lower half of the income pyramid. 
This reduces their capacity to negotiate 
The attraction of a populist solution is a 
latent possibility in the mesocratic type, 
often exerted when the claims of the 
organized masses are strong and conti-
nuous. It may also be attractive in the 
elitist type when the political régime is 
centred around an ambitious personality 
capable of mobilizing the mass of the 
population. In either case, a populist 
solution encounters resistance because 
wage increases and, consequently, their 
direct influence on incomes policies. 
While these factors mean that the 
economic and social position of these 
groups is weakened as regards their 
ability to exert pressure in the labour 
market, they nevertheless retain a great 
political potential which can be decisive 
in a representative régime depending on 
elections for political succession and 
legitimation. For this reason, and to gain 
their electoral support, at election time 
there tend to be indiscriminate wage 
increases and social security improve-
ments, and an expansion of public 
investment policies designed to produce 
short-term effects on working class 
employment and incomes (such as public 
works, housing plans, etc. ). These 
measures cause sharp short-run fluctua-
tions in the profile of the distribution 
and in the relative position of the various 
income groups.44 This is perhaps the 
main source of instability in the 
mesocratic distributive pyramid, which, 
because of the difference in the political 
base supporting it, becomes much more 
variable than the elitist-type pyramid, 
while its main trends are less easily 
perceptible in the short term. 
the redistributive concessions rarely hurt 
the highest income sectors. 
The necessary resources are obtained 
primarily from the middle and upper-
middle sectors, whose standards of living 
4<*Cf. CEPAL, Economic development and 
income distribution in Argentina, op. cit., 
passim. 
5. 
Some dynamic factors and their effects 
on income concentration 
234 CEPAL REVIEW / Second half of ¡976 
and aspirations —generally exorbitant-
may be considerably affected. These 
social layers, mainly made up of 
executives, technocrats, professionals 
and middle-level entrepreneurs, have 
high levels of consumption and inter-
national life styles and receive high 
profits, salaries and rewards in the big 
enterprises of the private sector or in the 
modernized area of the public sector. 
Often, therefore, their incomes are more 
closely related to those of their opposite 
numbers in equivalent strata in the 
developed countries than to the degree 
of development and average income in 
their own country. This visible disparity 
makes them an easy target of redistri-
butive policies of a populist stamp. 
Hence the chronic instability of the 
populist régime, whose continuity 
depends largely on overcoming the 
strong resistance put up by the high 
income sectors, which possess conside-
rable real power in the State and the 
economy and do not hesitate to use it to 
impose other political formulae which 
fully recognize their force within the 
leadership coalition and their right to 
enjoy their prerogatives. 
According to the empirical findings 
of Kuznets and Paukert which we 
mentioned earlier, the countries of Latin 
America should now be passing rapidly 
to a predominantly mesocratic type of 
concentration, with a growing improve-
ment in the position of the strata at the 
centre of the distributive scale at the 
expense of those at the top. The 
threshold fixed by Paukert for a more 
progressive distribution —a per capita 
income of about 500 dollars- has 
already been passed in some ten 
countries, as well as by the general 
average for the region in 1975. An exami-
nation of this proposition that progress 
in distribution depends on per capita 
income shows, however, that the trend is 
neither as linear nor as inexorable as is 
claimed. There is no strict correlation 
between the level of income and 
coefficients of inequality, although there 
is a vague trend along those lines. 
Not all the countries which have 
passed that threshold now show a more 
mesocratic type of concentration ; in 
some, precisely the opposite has 
occurred. Nor can it be said that this 
kind of concentration, once achieved, is 
permanent or becomes increasingly more 
democratic in the distribution of inco-
me. On the contrary, frequently this 
progress towards forms involving less 
inequality has led to conditions of 
instability and a backlash entailing a 
return to more elitist forms of concen-
tration. To consolidate a different type 
of concentration, the new dominant 
social forces must be restructured to a 
very high degree. 
This raises an important point which 
concerns the foundations of this study. 
It can be put as follows: the productive 
structure does not condition the distri-
bution of income as directly and 
mechanically as has sometimes been 
thought. As far as we are concerned, the 
two dimensions -production and distri-
bution— are relatively autonomous and 
interrelated by means of a set of 
complex connexions in which political 
mediation plays an important role, 
particularly in the short term. 
In fact, in the distribution and 
concentration of income the interrela-
tionship between economics and politics 
is so close that the effects of each tend 
to be circular. Sudden inflation, or 
chronic inflation which grows suddenly 
worse, accompanied by a severe, pro-
longed economic recession, may well 
trigger off a severe political crisis leading 
to the replacement of the governing 
group by another which better repre-
sents the new combination of social 
TYPES OF INCOME CONCENTRATION AND POLITICAL STYLES I Jorge Graciarena 235 
forces. In Latin America in recent years 
the adoption of shock policies has 
become widespread. These rapidly lead 
to a marked concentration of income at 
the very top, through a laissez-faire 
attitude to market forces and the 
implementation of sets of policies 
adopted by the government. 
In other cases, the exchanges in the 
distribution may stem from an autono-
mous political change in which fresh or 
different social forces come to play a 
dominant role in the management of the 
State and in the orientation of govern-
ment policies which affect income 
distribution. These readjustments are 
generally intrasystemic, since they do 
not transcend the original bases of the 
distribution of income, which are 
profoundly rooted in the productive 
structure and the social and political 
system. Only a social revolution can 
change these basic rules of the game. In 
the absence of such a revolution, the 
socio-economic system can admit, 
without changing its basic nature, a 
series of short-term swings and a certain 
variety of specific social forms which are 
historically conditioned. These specific 
social forms and the growth processes 
they create are what we have called 
elsewhere "development styles".45 
Before concluding, a few brief 
remarks seem to be called for on the 
difference between the political nature 
of the short-term and rather shallow 
swings in income distribution, and the 
more far-reaching and all-embracing 
changes which occur when the style of 
development changes along with the 
profile of the distribution. In the first 
45 Jorge Graciarena, "Power and deve-
lopment styles", CEPAL Review, First half of 
1976. 
case the variations in income may well 
be an aspect of the political game, where 
the tactics which may be used are flexible 
and are designed to expand the coalition 
of social forces with a view to fighting an 
election, for example. Nothing funda-
mental is changed, and most probably 
the high-income groups will recover their 
positions after the election period is 
over. 
It is a completely different matter 
when the changes in the profile of the 
distribution stem from structural trans-
formations and new correlations of 
social forces, and when emergent groups 
and sectors possess more real power in 
the civil society and the State apparatus, 
usually as a result of social and economic 
modernization. Although these condi-
tions are by no means determinants, the 
possibilities of change which they offer 
tend to give rise to political transforma-
tions of a permanent nature, effected in 
order to overcome certain features of the 
past, these thus become relatively stable 
solutions in comparison with other 
political options. 
Either of these alternatives repre-
sents a variant in the development style, 
whose direction and main content will 
define the kind of resource allocation 
policies as well as the income distribu-
tion policies which will prevail. Conver-
sely, the nature of the development style 
may be identified by the character of 
these policies. Hence, the viability of a 
style of development will always depend 
on the structuring of a political régime 
which is compatible with it and can 
ensure its continuity. In other words, the 
development style rests upon a political 
will which has the necessary capacity to 
promote and uphold it; and this calls for 
a balance between consensus and 
coercion. The structural tensions at the 
bottom of this ever-fluctuating balance 
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account for a large part of the dynamic concentration, political régimes and 
correlations between types of income development styles in Latin America. 
6. 
By way of a brief conclusion 
It appears, then, that in general the 
democratization of income distribution 
depends on the democratization of 
society. This appears tautological, and to 
some extent it is. In addition, there 
appears to be a high degree of 
association between power and income. 
In other words, and to be more specific, 
the requisites for achieving and consoli-
dating a mesocratic type of income 
concentration are the broadening of the 
political game, with more actors and 
participants, and a specialized political 
organization led by a political class and 
guided by a more open and pluralistic 
ideological market, in which the political 
régime and the fact of domination are 
legitimated primarily through popular 
consensus. When these political condi-
tions obtain, it is inevitable that 
income distribution will become more 
progressive. It could hardly be otherwise, 
because the acquisition of income is one 
of the principal targets of the political 
struggle. The other alternative is social 
demobilization and the technocratiza-
tion of politics, with a considerable 
increase in the amount of coercion and 
repression needed to ensure the conti-
nuity of the prevailing hegemonic 
régime. Naturally, this has repercussions 
on income concentration, increasing the 
inequality of its distribution. 
